China–India Rivalry in the Twenty-First Century Jeff M. Stefan Geens, “Google Maps' Arunachal Pradesh Place Names Turn Chinese, Google. Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas,” The Stimson Center,. Find local businesses, view maps and get driving directions in Google Maps.
China honed its 'salami tactics' in the Himalayas in the 1950s, when it grabbed the Aksai Chin plateau by surreptitiously building a strategic highway through that unguarded region. Aksai Chin, part of the original princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, provided China with the only passageway between its restive regions of Tibet and Xinjiang.
Although there is a general framework to settle the India-China border dispute, neither side can move forward with any agreement because a) both sides are 'fundamentally distrustful of each other'; and b) domestic politics will prevent either side from making any concessions. He said the talks have reached an impasse, and there is no hope of settling the issue in the near future.
Domestic politics play a major role in the dispute, and neither side would be able to make concessions without angering their domestic audience. Although China is not a democracy like India, the Chinese Government is afraid of rousing a public that is already sensitive about border issues.
In July 2017 India and China were caught in a lengthy confrontation along their shared frontier, spiking tensions and allowing a rabidly jingoistic press in both countries to aggravate the already deep-seated mutual distrust. The current confrontation seems to be the most serious in recent times and shows no signs of de-escalating. Both countries upped the ante and deployed around 3,000 troops each in the tri-junction.
'We firmly believe that the face-off in the Donglang area will end up with the Indian troops in retreat. The Indian military can choose to return to its territory with dignity or be kicked out of the area by Chinese soldiers,' China's nationalist tabloid Global Times said on July 5. 'This time we must teach New Delhi a bitter lesson.' An article on the PLA's English-language website, China Military Online, has warned that 'if a solution isn't reached through diplomatic or military communication or the issue isn't handled properly, another armed conflict ... is not completely out of the question.'
Chinese and Indian border troops confronted each other close to a valley controlled by China that separates India from Bhutan - a close Indian ally - and gives China access to the so-called Chicken's Neck, a thin strip of land that connects India to its remote northeastern regions. It escalated tensions between the neighboring giants, who share a 3,500-kilometer (2,175-mile) frontier, large parts of which are disputed.
Beijing alleges Indian troops crossed into a region known in China as Donglang, called Doklam in India, early in June and obstructed work on a road on the Himalayan plateau. Chinese officials say the Indian side's actions infringe upon an 1890 border agreement between Britain and China that previous Indian governments pledged to uphold.
India, meanwhile, claims Chinese troops entered and tried to construct a road in Bhutanese territory. Landlocked Bhutan, a small Himalayan nation sandwiched between India and China, is hugely dependent on New Delhi and does not have diplomatic relations with Beijing.
Bhutan said the construction of the road on its territory is 'a direct violation' of agreements with China. 'Bhutan hopes that the status quo in the Doklam area will be maintained as before June 16, 2017,' its foreign ministry said. Although China and Bhutan have been negotiating the precise border for decades without serious incident, Bhutan this time sought help from India, which considers the particular patch of mountain to be a strategically vital territory and sent troops to the plateau to stop the Chinese workers. Both sides have failed to fix the issue since then.
Chinese officials have also warned India that it should learn 'historic lessons' from its humiliating defeat in the 1962 war that both countries fought over their border. In response, Indian Defense Minister Arun Jaitley retorted that 'India in 2017 is different from India in 1962,' referring to its improved military strength. Indian media issued shrill warnings about Chinese expansionism, while Chinese state media ramped up their bellicose rhetoric, with the nationalist tabloid Global Times warning that Beijing would make no concessions.
On assuming power, the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) renounced all prior foreign agreements as unequal treaties imposed upon it during the 'century of humiliation' and demanded renegotiation of all borders. The Sino-India border remains the only major territorial dispute, other than South China Sea disputes, that China has not resolved. China‘s growing assertiveness in its territorial claims, especially on Arunachal Pradesh, and its relentless development of infrastructure in Tibet will shape the prospects of Sino-India relations.
The territory stretching from the jungles of northern Myanmar, westward to the Karakoram Range, and northward to the edge of the Tibetan plateau can be seen as a single geopolitical system referred to as the Himalayan-Tibetan massif. The ruggedness of this terrain makes movement of men and materiel extremely difficult, thus preventing Indian and Chinese civilizations from intermingling or projecting military power in these remote areas effectively. Not until 1962 did the Chinese and Indian armies fight each other over these desolate heights, thus altering the geopolitics of the region significantly.
The McMahon Line boundary dispute is at the heart of relations between China and India. China has land and sea boundary issues with 14 neighbors, mostly for historical reasons. The Chinese have two major claims on what India deems its own territory. One claim, in the western sector, is on Aksai Chin in the northeastern section of Ladakh District in Jammu and Kashmir. The other claim is in the eastern sector over a region included in the British-designated North-East Frontier Agency, the disputed part of which India renamed Arunachal Pradesh and made a state. In the fight over these areas in 1962, the well-trained and well-armed troops of the Chinese People's Liberation Army overpowered the ill-equipped Indian troops, who had not been properly acclimatized to fighting at high altitudes.
In the early 20th Century Britain sought to advance its line of control and establish buffer zones around its colony in South Asia. In 1913-1914 representatives of China, Tibet and Britain negotiated a treaty in India: the Simla Convention. Sir Henry McMahon, the foreign secretary of British India at the time, drew up the 550 mile (890 km) McMahon Line as the border between British India and Tibet during the Simla Conference. The so-called McMahon Line, drawn primarily on the highest watershed principle, demarcated what had previously been unclaimed or undefined borders between Britain and Tibet. The McMahon line moved British control substantially northwards. The Tibetan and British representatives at the conference agreed to the line, which ceded Tawang and other Tibetan areas to the imperial British Empire. However the Chinese representative refused to accept the line. Peking claimed territory in this far north down to the border of the plain of Assam.
The land is mostly mountainous with Himalayan ranges along the northern borders criss-crossed with mountain ranges running north-south. These divide the state into five river valleys: the Kameng, the Subansiri, the Siang, the Lohit and the Tirap. High mountains and dense forests have prevented intercommunication between tribes living in different river valleys. The geographical isolation thus imposed has led different tribes to elove their own dialects and grow with their distinct identities. Nature has endowed the Arunachal people with a deep sense of beauty which finds delightful expression in their songs, dances and crafts.
A slow forward move towards the McMahon Line was begun on the ground, to establish a new de facto boundary. The McMahon Line was then forgotten until about 1935 when the British government decided to publish the documents in the 1937 edition of Aitchison's Collection of Treaties. The NEFA (North East Frontier Agency) was created in 1954. On 7 November 1959, Chou En-lai proposed that both sides should withdraw their troops twenty kilometers from the McMahon line. The issue was quiet during the decade of cordial Sino-Indian relations, but erupted again during the Sino-Indian War of 1962. During the 1962 war, the PRC captured most of the NEFA. However, China soon declared victory and voluntarily withdrew back to the McMahon Line.
China is in occupation of approximately 38,000 sq. kms of Indian territory in Jammu and Kashmir. In addition, under the so-called China-Pakistan 'Boundary Agreement' of 1963, Pakistan ceded 5,180 sq. kms. of Indian territory in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir to China. China claims approximately 90,000 sq. kms. of Indian territory in Arunachal Pradesh and about 2000 sq. kms. in the Middle Sector of the India-China boundary. Beijing has stated that it does not recognise Arunachal Pradesh.
The border between China and India has never been officially delimited. China's position on the eastern part of the border between the two countries is consistent. Not a single Chinese government recognizes the 'illegal' McMahon Line. For China, the McMahon Line, stands as a symbol of imperialist aggression on the country. The so-called 'Arunachal Pradesh' dispute is China's most intractable border issue. Because the gap between the positions of China and India is wide, it is difficult for both nations to reach consensus. The area of this disputed region is three times that of Taiwan, six times that of Beijing and ten times that of the Malvenas islands, disputed by Britain and Argentina. It is flat and rich in water and forest resources.
Arunachal Pradesh is the only issue which has a potential for conflict between India and China. If ever India and China go to war one day, it will be on this issue. India considers recurring Sino-Indian border clashes a potential threat to its security. Since the war, each side continued to improve its military and logistics capabilities in the disputed regions. China has continued its occupation of the Aksai Chin area, through which it built a strategic highway linking Xizang and Xinjiang autonomous regions. China had a vital military interest in maintaining control over this region, whereas India's primary interest lay in Arunachal Pradesh, its state in the northeast bordering Xizang Autonomous Region.
Barring an armed clash at Nathu La in eastern Sikkim in 1967, the border between India and China (Tibet) - and specifically the ill-defined Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh/Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh - had remained free of any major incidents through the 1970s and the early 1980s. While relations between the two countries remained cool, official statements from Beijing and New Delhi professed a desire to solve the border tangle peacefully through mutual consultations. Beginning in December 1981, officials from both countries held yearly talks on the border issue.
With the improvement of logistics on the Indian side, the Indian Army sought to reinforce and strengthen forward areas in Arunachal Pradesh in the early 1980s. Patrols resumed in 1981 and by the summer of 1984 India had established an observation post on the bank of the Sumdorong Chu [referred to as Sangduoluo He in the Chinese media].
In July 1986 there were reports in the Indian media of Chinese incursions into the Sumdorong Chu [S-C] rivervalley in Arunachal Pradesh. By September-October, an brigade of the Indian Army 5 Mountain Division was airlifted to Zimithang, a helipad very close to the S-C valley. Referred to as Operation Falcon, this involved the occupation of ridges overlooking the S-C valley, including Langrola and the Hathung La ridge across the Namka Chu rivulet.
This was followed by reports of large-scale troop movements on both sides of the border in early 1987, and grave concerns about a possible military clash over the border. In February 1987, India established the so-called Arunachal Pradesh in its ['illegally occupied'] Chinese-claimed territories south of the McMahon Line. The Chinese side made solemn statements on many occasions that China never recognizes the 'illegal' McMahon Line and the 'so-called' Arunachal Pradesh. After these events, and India's conversion of Arunachal Pradesh from union territory to state, tensions between China and India escalated. Both sides moved to reinforce their capabilities in the area, but neither ruled out further negotiations of their dispute.
China, which had always maintained a large military presence in Tibet, was said to have moved in 20,000 troops from the'53rd Army Corps in Chengdu and the 13th Army in Lanzhou by early 1987, along with heavy artillery and helicopters. By early April, it had moved 8 divisions to eastern Tibet as a prelude to possible belligerent action. Reinforcements on the Indian side began with Operation Falcon in late 1986, and continued through early 1987 under Exercise Chequerboard. This massive air-land exercise involved 10 Divisions of the Indian Army and several squadrons of the IAF. The Indian Army moved 3 divisions to positions around Wangdung, where they were supplied solely by air. These reinforcements were over and above the 50,000 troops already present across Arunachal Pradesh.
Although India enjoyed air superiority in 1987, rough parity on the ground existed between the two military forces, which had a combined total of nearly 400,000 troops near the border. The Indian Army deployed eleven divisions in the region, backed up by paramilitary forces, whereas the PLA had fifteen divisions available for operations on the border. Most observers believe that the mountainous terrain, high-altitude climate, and concomitant logistic difficulties made it unlikely that a protracted or larges-cale conflict would erupt on the Sino-Indian border.
That the Sino-Indian border has not suffered any major disruptions since 1986, as compared to the incessant firing incidents and infiltration on the Indo-Pak borders, made the Sino-Indian border an example of good neighbourly relations.
In December 1988, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China. The Prime Ministers of the two countries agreed to settle the boundary questions through the guiding principle of 'Mutual Understanding and Accommodation and Mutual Adjustment'. Agreement also reached that while seeking for the mutually acceptable solution to the boundary questions, the two countries should develop their relations in other fields and make efforts to create the atmosphere and conditions conducive to the settlement of the boundary questions. The two sides agreed to establish a Joint Working Group (JWG) on the boundary questions at the Vice-Foreign Ministerial level.
An Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas was signed on 7 September 1993. After more than thirty years of border tension and stalemate, high-level bilateral talks were held in New Delhi starting in February 1994 to foster 'confidence-building measures' between the defense forces of India and China, and a new period of better relations began. In November 1995, the two sides dismantled the guard posts in close proximity to each other along the borderline in Wangdong area, making the situation in the border areas more stable. During President Jiang Zemin's visit to India at the end of November 1996, the Governments of China and India signed the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas, which is an important step for the building of mutual trust between the two countries. These Agreements provide an institutional framework for the maintenance of peace and tranquility in the border areas.
Though lot had been done during the Sino-Indian official border talks, with number of border related CSBMs put in place, the border issue remains mired in various bilateral and domestic compulsions and contradictions on both sides. Border 'encounters' between India and China are not rare and arise from the very real disagreements that exist between the two sides in demarcating the LCA on the ground. Such incidents have usually been handled, not in full media glare, but by the two sides discreetly withdrawing to their earlier positions.
The two sides withdrew sentries along the eastern section that were considered to be too close to each other. During early 1990s, India unilaterally withdrew about 35,000 troops from its eastern sector. On the other hand, the PLA maintains a force between 180,000 and 300,000 soldiers and has directly ruled Tibet from 1950 to 1976, and indirectly thereafter. Tibet today is connected to other military regions through four-lane highways and strategic roads. And Beijing's capability to airlift troops from its other neighbouring military regions has advanced very far from its comparative inability to use air force in 1962.
During the Indian Prime Minister's visit to China in June 2003 India and China signed a Memorandum on Expanding Border Trade, which adds Nathula as another pass on the India-China border for conducting border trade. The Indian side has agreed to designate Changgu of Sikkim state as the venue for border trade market, while the Chinese side has agreed to designate Renqinggang of the Tibet Autonomous Region as the venue for border trade market.
During Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India in April 2005, the two sides signed an agreement on political settlement of the boundary issue, setting guidelines and principles. In the agreement, China and India affirmed their readiness to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the boundary issue through equal and friendly negotiations.
India after 1962 adopted a policy to not develop the border areas. The idea was that if India developed the border areas, the Chinese can easily use these facilities in the event of a war. This policy had changed by 2008. To redress the situation arising out of poor road connectivity which has hampered the operational capability of the Border Guarding Forces deployed along the India-China border, the Government has decided to undertake phase-wise construction of 27 road links totaling 608 Km in the border areas along the India-China border in the States of Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh at an estimated cost of Rs.912.00 crores. The work of construction of 2 roads in Arunachal Pradesh has started. The construction of these roads was expected to start during 2008-09.
The two sides have differences in perception of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the India-China border areas. Both sides carry out patrolling activity in the India-China border areas. Transgressions of the LAC are taken up through diplomatic channels and at Border Personnel Meetings/Flag Meetings. India and China seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement of the boundary question through peaceful consultations.
Chinese President Hu Jintao met with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Sanya City, south China's Hainan Province, April 13, 2011. Hu said China is willing to further push forward negotiations on border issues on the basis of peace and friendliness, equal consultation, mutual respect and understanding. The two sides should consider setting up a consultation and coordination mechanism on border issues so as to achieve consensus as soon as possible and to better maintain peace and stability at the border regions before the issues are solved.
China wants India to put behind the 1962 war as an 'unfortunate' thing of the past and that the two countries should strengthen their military ties including formalising a border management pact under which their troops will not fire at each other. The Chinese assessment was conveyed to the Indian defence ministry team which visited Beijing on 14-15 January 2013 for the third round of the annual defense dialogue between the two countries.
Border tensions between China and India flared after New Delhi claimed a contingent of 30 to 50 PLA soldiers crossed about 12 miles beyond the Line of Actual Control between the two countries on 15 April 2012 and stayed there for three weeks. According to New Delhi, PLA soldiers frequently conduct border incursions (more than 600 times over the last three years) but do not usually cross more than a few miles over the Line of Actual Control nor stay there longer than several hours.
Beijing denied Chinese troops had crossed into Indian territory. A Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson said, ‘‘China has always acted in strict compliance with relevant agreements and protocols between the two countries on maintaining peace and tranquility in the Line of Actual Control area along the border . . . Chinese patrol troops have never crossed the line.’’ Chinese Premier Li Keqiang attempted to downplay the incident and the risk of conflict. During a state visit to India, he insisted that ‘‘a few clouds in the sky cannot shut out the brilliant rays of our friendship.’’ Premier Li did not directly address the alleged Chinese incursion, though he said ‘‘both sides believe we need to improve various border-related mechanisms that we have put into place and make them more efficient, and we need to appropriately manage and resolve our differences.’’
President Xi Jinping met Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the BRICS Summit in Durban, South Africa, 29 March 2013. Xi urged both sides to use special representatives to strive for a fair, rational framework that can lead to a solution to the border issue as soon as possible. India will abide by political guidelines set by both sides and seek a solution to the border issue with a commitment to safeguarding peace, Singh said. Since 2003, more than a dozen rounds of talks had been launched to resolve the border disputes. But ties have still been occasionally strained by the issue and overshadowed by closer India-US relations amid Washington's accelerating Asia 'pivot' policy.
Beijing and New Delhi resolved the April border impasse in May after a series of talks and agreed to pursue a formal agreement to build trust and confidence between the border troops. The two sides signed the agreement during the Indian prime minister’s trip to China in October 2013. China and India concluded a border defense cooperation pact 24 October 2013, making it a highlight of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to the Asian neighbor. The Indian Express newspaper said the pact also puts no restrictions on India developing border infrastructure or enhancing military capabilities along the border. It quoted India's Ambassador to China S. Jai Shanker as saying: 'This principle allows both countries to take appropriate measures according to their own security needs.'
Nevertheless, the potential for periodic low-level confrontations between border patrols to escalate likely will persist. Indian media have reported several additional albeit briefer incursions by Chinese troops since the April standoff. Furthermore, both China and India continue to boost their militaries’ capabilities on the border, adding to mutual suspicion. This has left both sides sensitive to each other’s border activities and disposed toward worst-case perceptions of the other sides’ intentions and activities. Ely Ratner and Alexander Sullivan of the Center for a New American Security, warn: ‘‘more intense strategic competition between India and China would reverberate throughout the continent, exacerbating tensions in Central Asia, the Indian Ocean, and Southeast Asia. Disruptions to the Asian engine of economic growth caused by these tensions could debilitate the global economy.’’
Chinese troops entered disputed territory along the Sino-Indian border, Indian media sources reported, claiming it's not the first time China has made an incursion into the Indian border region. 'Chinese troops are reported to have entered 25 to 30km deep into Indian territory in Burtse area in Ladakh where they had pitched their tents last year that had led to a tense three-week standoff,' The Times of India reported on 18 August 2014. Citing official sources, the media outlet notes that troops from the People's Liberation Army were spotted on Monday near the 'New Patrol base' post in Ladakh's Burtse area. According to these sources, the PLA has crossed a de-facto border known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and moved deeper into Indian-held territory. The PLA reportedly carried flags reading 'this is Chinese territory, go back' in their hands.
India Prime Minister Narendra Modi urged visiting Chinese President Xi Jinping to resolve a boundary dispute after holding talks in New Delhi 18 September 2014 that lasted much longer than the stipulated 90 minutes. Modi said he had raised serious concerns over the issue with Chinese President Xi Jinping. He said the boundary dispute must be resolved soon. The Indian leader said they were clear that peace on the border has to be the foundation of the trust and relationship between the two nations. Modi called for an early clarification of the “line of actual control” which presently separates the two countries. He said if this happened “we can realize the potential of our relations.' Xi’s visit to India took place as troops from both countries were engaged in a border standoff in the Ladakh region - one of their worst in recent years. The Chinese leader played down the tensions, attributing such incidents to their undemarcated border.
India's foreign minister said 26 September 2014 that India and China had resolved a tense, two-week military border standoff in the northern Himalayan region. Sushma Swaraj said after meeting with Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in New York that Chinese troops would begin withdrawing Friday 26 September 2014 and would be finished by Tuesday. She described the resolution as a 'big accomplishment.' Hundreds of Chinese troops moved into a territory claimed by India, sparking the standoff on the remote mountainous frontier of Ladakh. India said the Chinese troops wanted to extend a road they were building on their side of the border into territory claimed by India. China agreed not to extend the road into the disputed territory. In return, India agreed to demolish a recently built observation hut.
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Sovereignty over two separated pieces of territory have been contested between China and India. Aksai Chin is located either in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir or the Chinese province of Xinjiang and forms part of the Kashmir conflict. It is a virtually uninhabited high-altitude wasteland crossed by the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway. The other disputed territory lies south of the McMahon Line. It was formerly referred to as the North East Frontier Agency, and is now called Arunachal Pradesh. The McMahon Line was part of the 1914 Simla Convention between British India and Tibet, an agreement rejected by China.[1]
The 1962 Sino-Indian War was fought in both of these areas. An agreement to resolve the dispute was concluded in 1996, including 'confidence-building measures' and a mutually agreed Line of Actual Control. In 2006, the Chinese ambassador to India claimed that all of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory[2] amidst a military buildup.[3] At the time, both countries claimed incursions as much as a kilometre at the northern tip of Sikkim.[4] In 2009, India announced it would deploy additional military forces along the border.[5] In 2014, India proposed China should acknowledge a 'One India' policy to resolve the border dispute.[6][7]
- 1Background
- 1.1Aksai Chin
- 2Boundary discussions and disputes
Background[edit]
Aksai Chin[edit]
From the area's lowest point (on the Karakash River at about 14,000 feet (4,300 m) to the glaciated peaks up to 22,500 feet (6,900 m) above sea level, this is a desolate, largely uninhabited area. It covers an area of about 37,244 square kilometres (14,380 sq mi). The desolation of Aksai Chin meant that it had no significant human importance other than ancient trade routes crossing it, providing brief passage during summer for caravans of yaks from Xinjiang and Tibet.[8]
One of the earliest treaties regarding the boundaries in the western sector was issued in 1842. The Sikh Empire of the Punjab region had annexed Ladakh into the state of Jammu in 1834. In 1841, they invaded Tibet with an army. Chinese forces defeated the Sikh army and in turn entered Ladakh and besieged Leh. After being checked by the Sikh forces, the Chinese and the Sikhs signed a treaty in September 1842, which stipulated no transgressions or interference in the other country's frontiers.[9] The British defeat of the Sikhs in 1846 resulted in transfer of sovereignty over Ladakh to the British, and British commissioners attempted to meet with Chinese officials to discuss the border they now shared. However, both sides were sufficiently satisfied that a traditional border was recognised and defined by natural elements, and the border was not demarcated.[9] The boundaries at the two extremities, Pangong Lake and Karakoram Pass, were reasonably well-defined, but the Aksai Chin area in between lay largely undefined.[8][10]
The Johnson Line[edit]
W. H. Johnson, a civil servant with the Survey of India proposed the 'Johnson Line' in 1865, which put Aksai Chin in Jammu and Kashmir. This was the time of the Dungan revolt, when China did not control Xinjiang, so this line was never presented to the Chinese. Johnson presented this line to the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, who then claimed the 18,000 square kilometres contained within his territory[11] and by some accounts[citation needed] he claimed territory further north as far as the Sanju Pass in the Kun Lun Mountains. Johnson's work was severely criticised for gross inaccuracies, with description of his boundary as 'patently absurd',[1] and he was reprimanded by the British Government and resigned from the Survey.[1][11][12] The Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir constructed a fort at Shahidulla (modern-day Xaidulla), and had troops stationed there for some years to protect caravans.[13] Eventually, most sources placed Shahidulla and the upper Karakash River firmly within the territory of Xinjiang (see accompanying map). According to Francis Younghusband, who explored the region in the late 1880s, there was only an abandoned fort and not one inhabited house at Shahidulla when he was there – it was just a convenient staging post and a convenient headquarters for the nomadic Kirghiz.[14] The abandoned fort had apparently been built a few years earlier by the Dogras.[15] In 1878 the Chinese had reconquered Xinjiang, and by 1890 they already had Shahidulla before the issue was decided.[11] By 1892, China had erected boundary markers at Karakoram Pass.[1]
In 1897 a British military officer, Sir John Ardagh, proposed a boundary line along the crest of the Kun Lun Mountains north of the Yarkand River.[13] At the time Britain was concerned at the danger of Russian expansion as China weakened, and Ardagh argued that his line was more defensible. The Ardagh line was effectively a modification of the Johnson line, and became known as the 'Johnson-Ardagh Line'.
The Macartney-Macdonald Line[edit]
In 1893, Hung Ta-chen, a senior Chinese official at St. Petersburg, gave maps of the region to George Macartney, the British consul general at Kashgar, which coincided in broad details.[16] In 1899, Britain proposed a revised boundary, initially suggested by Macartney and developed by the Governor General of India Lord Elgin. This boundary placed the Lingzi Tang plains, which are south of the Laktsang range, in India, and Aksai Chin proper, which is north of the Laktsang range, in China. This border, along the Karakoram Mountains, was proposed and supported by British officials for a number of reasons. The Karakoram Mountains formed a natural boundary, which would set the British borders up to the Indus Riverwatershed while leaving the Tarim River watershed in Chinese control, and Chinese control of this tract would present a further obstacle to Russian advance in Central Asia.[12] The British presented this line, known as the Macartney-MacDonald Line, to the Chinese in 1899 in a note by Sir Claude MacDonald. The Qing government did not respond to the note, and the British took that as Chinese acquiescence.[11] Although no official boundary had ever been negotiated, China believed that this had been the accepted boundary.[17][18]
1899 to 1947[edit]
Both the Johnson-Ardagh and the Macartney-MacDonald lines were used on British maps of India.[11] Until at least 1908, the British took the Macdonald line to be the boundary,[19] but in 1911, the Xinhai Revolution resulted in the collapse of central power in China, and by the end of World War I, the British officially used the Johnson Line. However they took no steps to establish outposts or assert actual control on the ground. In 1927, the line was adjusted again as the government of British India abandoned the Johnson line in favour of a line along the Karakoram range further south. However, the maps were not updated and still showed the Johnson Line.[1]
From 1917 to 1933, the 'Postal Atlas of China', published by the Government of China in Peking had shown the boundary in Aksai Chin as per the Johnson line, which runs along the Kunlun mountains.[16][18] The 'Peking University Atlas', published in 1925, also put the Aksai Chin in India.[20]:101 When British officials learned of Soviet officials surveying the Aksai Chin for Sheng Shicai, warlord of Xinjiang in 1940–1941, they again advocated the Johnson Line.[11] At this point the British had still made no attempts to establish outposts or control over the Aksai Chin, nor was the issue ever discussed with the governments of China or Tibet, and the boundary remained undemarcated at India's independence.[1][11]
Since 1947[edit]
Upon independence in 1947, the government of India used the Johnson Line as the basis for its official boundary in the west, encompassing Aksai Chin.[1] However, India did not claim the northern areas near Shahidulla and Khotan, for including which in Indian territory, among other things, Johnson had been criticised. From the Karakoram Pass (which is not under dispute), the Indian claim line extends northeast of the Karakoram Mountains north of the salt flats of the Aksai Chin, to set a boundary at the Kunlun Mountains, and incorporating part of the Karakash River and Yarkand River watersheds. From there, it runs east along the Kunlun Mountains, before turning southwest through the Aksai Chin salt flats, through the Karakoram Mountains, and then to Pangong Lake.[8]
On 1 July 1954 Prime Minister Nehru wrote a memo directing that the maps of India be revised to show definite boundaries on all frontiers. Up to this point, the boundary in the Aksai Chin sector, based on the Johnson Line, had been described as 'undemarcated.'[12]
Trans Karakoram Tract[edit]
The Johnson Line is not used west of the Karakoram Pass, where China adjoins Pakistan-administered Gilgit–Baltistan. On 13 October 1962, China and Pakistan began negotiations over the boundary west of the Karakoram Pass. In 1963, the two countries settled their boundaries largely on the basis of the Macartney-MacDonald Line, which left the Trans Karakoram Tract 5,800 km2 / 5,180 km2 in China, although the agreement provided for renegotiation in the event of a settlement of the Kashmir conflict. India does not recognise that Pakistan and China have a common border, and claims the tract as part of the domains of the pre-1947 state of Kashmir and Jammu. However, India's claim line in that area does not extend as far north of the Karakoram Mountains as the Johnson Line. China & India still have disputes on these borders.[8]
The McMahon Line[edit]
British India and China gained a common border in 1826, with British annexation of Assam in the Treaty of Yandabo at the conclusion of the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826). Subsequent annexations in further Anglo-Burmese Wars expanded China's borders with British India eastwards, to include the border with what is now Burma.
In 1913–14, representatives of Britain, China, and Tibet attended a conference in Simla, India and drew up an agreement concerning Tibet's status and borders. The McMahon Line, a proposed boundary between Tibet and India for the eastern sector, was drawn by British negotiator Henry McMahon on a map attached to the agreement. All three representatives initialled the agreement, but Beijing soon objected to the proposed Sino-Tibet boundary and repudiated the agreement, refusing to sign the final, more detailed map. After approving a note which stated that China could not enjoy rights under the agreement unless she ratified it, the British and Tibetan negotiators signed the Simla Convention and more detailed map as a bilateral accord. Neville Maxwell states that McMahon had been instructed not to sign bilaterally with Tibetans if China refused, but he did so without the Chinese representative present and then kept the declaration secret.[8]
V.K. Singh argues that the basis of these boundaries, accepted by British India and Tibet, were that the historical boundaries of India were the Himalayas and the areas south of the Himalayas were traditionally Indian and associated with India. The high watershed of the Himalayas was proposed as the border between India and its northern neighbours. India's government held the view that the Himalayas were the ancient boundaries of the Indian subcontinent and thus should be the modern boundaries of British India and later the Republic of India.[21]
Chinese boundary markers, including one set up by the newly created Chinese Republic, stood near Walong until January 1914, when T. O'Callaghan, an assistant administrator of North East Frontier Agency (NEFA)'s eastern sector, relocated them north to locations closer to the McMahon Line (albeit still South of the Line). He then went to Rima, met with Tibetan officials, and saw no Chinese influence in the area.[1]
By signing the Simla Agreement with Tibet, the British had violated the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, in which both parties were not to negotiate with Tibet, 'except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government', as well as the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906, which bound the British government 'not to annex Tibetan territory.'[22] Because of doubts concerning the legal status of the accord, the British did not put the McMahon Line on their maps until 1937, nor did they publish the Simla Convention in the treaty record until 1938. Rejecting Tibet's 1913 declaration of independence, China argued that the Simla Convention and McMahon Line were illegal and that Tibetan government was merely a local government without treaty-making powers. In 1947, Tibet requested that India recognise Tibetan authority in the trading town of Tawang, south of the McMahon Line. Tibet did not object to any other portion of the McMahon line. In reply, the Indians asked Tibet to continue the relationship on the basis of the previous British Government.[8]
The British records show that the Tibetan government’s acceptance of the new border in 1914 was conditional on China accepting the Simla Convention. Since the British were not able to get an acceptance from China, Tibetans considered the MacMahon line invalid.[23] Tibetan officials continued to administer Tawang and refused to concede territory during negotiations in 1938. The governor of Assam asserted that Tawang was 'undoubtedly British' but noted that it was 'controlled by Tibet, and none of its inhabitants have any idea that they are not Tibetan.' During World War II, with India's east threatened by Japanese troops and with the threat of Chinese expansionism, British troops secured Tawang for extra defence.[1]
China's claim on areas south of the McMahon Line, encompassed in the NEFA, were based on the traditional boundaries. India believes that the boundaries China proposed in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh have no written basis and no documentation of acceptance by anyone apart from China. Indians argue that China claims the territory on the basis that it was under Chinese imperial control in the past,[21] while Chinese argue that India claims the territory on the basis that it was under British imperial control in the past.[24] The last Qing emperor's 1912 edict of abdication authorised its succeeding republican government to form a union of 'five peoples, namely, Manchus, Han Chinese, Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetanstogether with their territory in its integrity.'[25] However, the practice that India does not place a claim to the regions which previously had the presence of the Mauryan Empire and Chola Dynasty, but which were heavily influenced by Indian culture, further complicates the issue.[21]
India's claim line in the eastern sector follows the McMahon Line. The line drawn by McMahon on the detailed 24–25 March 1914 Simla Treaty maps clearly starts at 27°45’40'N, a trijunction between Bhutan, China, and India, and from there, extends eastwards.[8] Most of the fighting in the eastern sector before the start of the war would take place immediately north of this line.[1][26] However, India claimed that the intent of the treaty was to follow the main watershed ridge divide of the Himalayas based on memos from McMahon and the fact that over 90% of the McMahon Line does in fact follow the main watershed ridge divide of the Himalayas. They claimed that territory south of the high ridges here near Bhutan (as elsewhere along most of the McMahon Line) should be Indian territory and north of the high ridges should be Chinese territory. In the Indian claim, the two armies would be separated from each other by the highest mountains in the world.
During and after the 1950s, when India began patrolling this area and mapping in greater detail, they confirmed what the 1914 Simla agreement map depicted: six river crossings that interrupted the main Himalayan watershed ridge. At the westernmost location near Bhutan north of Tawang, they modified their maps to extend their claim line northwards to include features such as Thag La ridge, Longju, and Khinzemane as Indian territory.[8] Thus, the Indian version of the McMahon Line moves the Bhutan-China-India trijunction north to 27°51’30'N.[8] India would claim that the treaty map ran along features such as Thag La ridge, though the actual treaty map itself is topographically vague (as the treaty was not accompanied with demarcation) in places, shows a straight line (not a watershed ridge) near Bhutan and near Thag La, and the treaty includes no verbal description of geographic features nor description of the highest ridges.[8][27]
Boundary discussions and disputes[edit]
1947–1962[edit]
During the 1950s, the People's Republic of China built a 1,200 kilometres (750 mi) road connecting Xinjiang and western Tibet, of which 179 kilometres (111 mi) ran south of the Johnson Line through the Aksai Chin region claimed by India.[1][8][11] Aksai Chin was easily accessible from China, but for the Indians on the south side of the Karakoram, the mountain range proved to be an complication in their access to Aksai Chin.[8] The Indians did not learn of the existence of the road until 1957, which was confirmed when the road was shown in Chinese maps published in 1958.[28]
The Indian position, as stated by prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, was that the Aksai Chin was 'part of the Ladakh region of India for centuries' and that this northern border was a 'firm and definite one which was not open to discussion with anybody'.[8]
The Chinese minister, Zhou Enlai argued that the western border had never been delimited, that the Macartney-MacDonald Line, which left the Aksai Chin within Chinese borders was the only line ever proposed to a Chinese government, and that the Aksai Chin was already under Chinese jurisdiction, and that negotiations should take into account the status quo.[8]
In 1960, based on an agreement between Nehru and Zhou Enlai, officials from India and China held discussions in order to settle the boundary dispute.[20] China and India disagreed on the major watershed that defined the boundary in the western sector.[20]:96 The Chinese statements with respect to their border claims often misrepresented the cited sources.[29]
1963–present[edit]
In April 2013 India claimed, referencing their own perception[30] of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) location, that Chinese troops had established a camp in the Daulat Beg Oldi sector, 10 km on their side of the Line of Actual Control. This figure was later revised to a 19 km claim. According to Indian media, the incursion included Chinese military helicopters entering Indian airspace to drop supplies to the troops. However, Chinese officials denied any trespassing having taken place.[31][32] Soldiers from both countries briefly set up camps on the ill-defined frontier facing each other, but the tension was defused when both sides pulled back soldiers in early May.[33] In September 2014, India and China had a standoff at the LAC, when Indian workers began constructing a canal in the border village of Demchok, and Chinese civilians protested with the army's support. It ended after about three weeks, when both sides agreed to withdraw troops.[34] The Indian army claimed that the Chinese military had set up a camp 3 km inside territory claimed by India.[35] An article on the BBC website states that China gains territory with every incursion.[36]
In September 2015, Chinese and Indian troops faced-off in the Burtse region of northern Ladakh after Indian troops dismantled a disputed watchtower the Chinese were building close to the mutually-agreed patrolling line.[37]
The Doklam Military Standoff in 2017[edit]
In June, a military standoff occurred between India and China in the disputed territory of Doklam, near the Doka La pass. On June 16, 2017, the Chinese brought heavy road building equipment to the Doka La region and began constructing a road in the disputed area.[38] Previously, China had built a dirt road terminating at Doka La where Indian troops were stationed.[38] They would conduct foot patrol from this point up till the Royal Bhutanese Army (RBA) post at Jampheri Ridge.[38] The dispute that ensued post June 16 stemmed from the fact that the Chinese had begun building a road below Doka La, in what India and Bhutan claim to be disputed territory.[38] This resulted in Indian intervention of China’s road construction on June 18, two days after construction began. Bhutan claims that the Chinese have violated the written agreements between the two countries that were drawn up in 1988 and 1998 after extensive rounds of talks.[39] The agreements drawn state that status quo must be maintained in the Doklam area as of before March 1959.[39] It is these agreements that China has violated by constructing a road below Doka La. A series of statements from each countries' respective External Affairs ministries were issued defending each countries' actions. Due to the ambiguity of earlier rounds of border talks beginning from the 1890 Anglo-Chinese Convention that was signed in Kolkata on March 17, 1890, each country refers to different agreements drawn when trying to defend its position on the border dispute.[38][39] Following the incursion, on June 28, the Chinese military claimed that India had halted construction of a road that was taking place in Chinese sovereign territory.[40] On June 30, India's Foreign Ministry claimed that China's road construction in violation of the status quo had security implications for India.[41] Following this, on July 5, Bhutan issued a demarche asking China to restore the status quo as of before June 16.[42] Throughout July and August, the Doklam issue remained unresolved. On August 28, India issued a statement saying that both countries have agreed to 'expeditious disengagement' in the Doklam region.[40]
Sikkim[edit]
The Nathu La and Cho La clashes were a series of military clashes in 1967 between India and China alongside the border of the Himalayan Kingdom of Sikkim, then an Indian protectorate. The end of the conflicts saw a Chinese military withdrawal from Sikkim.
In 1975, the Sikkim monarchy held a referendum, in which the Sikkemese voted overwhelmingly in favour of joining India.[43][44] At the time China protested and rejected it as illegal. The Sino-Indian Memorandum of 2003 was hailed as a de facto Chinese acceptance of the annexation.[45] China published a map showing Sikkim as a part of India and the Foreign Ministry deleted it from the list of China's 'border countries and regions'.[45] However, the Sikkim-China border's northernmost point, 'The Finger', continues to be the subject of dispute and military activity.[4]
Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao said in 2005 that 'Sikkim is no longer the problem between China and India.'[46]
See also[edit]
References[edit]
- ^ abcdefghijkCalvin, James Barnard (April 1984). 'The China-India Border War'. Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Archived from the original on 11 November 2011.
- ^'Arunachal Pradesh is our territory': Chinese envoyRediff India Abroad, 14 November 2006. Archived 8 November 2011 at the Wayback Machine
- ^Subir Bhaumik, 'India to deploy 36,000 extra troops on Chinese border', BBC, 23 November 2010. Archived 2 January 2012 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ abSudha Ramachandran, 'China toys with India's border', Asia Times Online, 27 June 2008. Archived 22 November 2009 at the Stanford Web Archive
- ^'The China-India Border Brawl', Wall Street Journal, 24 June 2009, archived from the original on 23 September 2011
- ^何, 宏儒 (12 June 2014). '外長會 印向陸提一個印度政策'. 中央通訊社. 新德里. Archived from the original on 27 February 2017. Retrieved 27 February 2017.
- ^'印度外長敦促中國重申「一個印度」政策'. BBC 中文网. Archived from the original on 27 February 2017. Retrieved 27 February 2017.
- ^ abcdefghijklmnMaxwell, India's China War (1970)
- ^ abThe Sino-Indian Border Disputes, by Alfred P. Rubin, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1. (Jan. 1960), pp. 96–125. JSTOR756256.
- ^Guruswamy, Mohan (2006). Emerging Trends in India-China Relations. India: Hope India Publications. p. 222. ISBN978-81-7871-101-0.
- ^ abcdefghMohan Guruswamy, Mohan, 'The Great India-China Game', Rediff, 23 June 2003. Archived 30 September 2016 at the Wayback Machine.
- ^ abcNoorani, A.G. (30 August), 'Fact of History', Frontline, vol. 26 no. 18, archived from the original on 2 October 2011Check date values in:
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(help) - ^ abWoodman, Himalayan Frontiers (1970), pp. 101, 360–
- ^Younghusband, Francis E. (1896). The Heart of a Continent. John Murray, London. Facsimile reprint: (2005) Elbiron Classics, pp. 223–224.
- ^Grenard, Fernand (1904). Tibet: The Country and its Inhabitants. Fernand Grenard. Translated by A. Teixeira de Mattos. Originally published by Hutchison and Co., London. 1904. Reprint: Cosmo Publications. Delhi. 1974, pp. 28–30.
- ^ abcWoodman, Himalayan Frontiers (1970), pp. 73, 78
- ^'India-China Border Dispute'. GlobalSecurity.org. Archived from the original on 15 February 2015.
- ^ abVerma, Virendra Sahai (2006). 'Sino-Indian Border Dispute At Aksai Chin - A Middle Path For Resolution'. Journal of Development Alternatives and Area Studies. 25 (3): 6–8. ISSN1651-9728.
- ^Woodman, Himalayan Frontiers (1970), pp. 79
- ^ abcFisher, Rose & Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground (1963), p. 91
- ^ abcV. K. Singh, Resolving the boundary dispute, india-seminar.com. Archived 18 October 2006 at the Wayback Machine
- ^Karunakar Gupta. The McMahon Line 1911–45: The British Legacy, The China Quarterly, No. 47. (Jul. – Sep. 1971), pp. 521–545. JSTOR652324
- ^Tsering Shakya (1999). The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947. Columbia University Press. pp. 279–. ISBN978-0-231-11814-9.
- ^Arthur A. Stahnke. 'The Place of International Law in Chinese Strategy and Tactics: The Case of the Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute', The Journal of Asian Studies. Vol. 30, No. 1, Nov 1970. pg. 95–119
- ^Qing Dynasty Edict of Abdication, translated by Bertram Lenox Putnam Weale, The Fight for the Republic in China, London: Hurst & Blackett, Ltd. Paternoster House, E.C. 1918. – Emphasis added, 'Muslims' rendered as 'Mohammedans' in original translation
- ^A.G. Noorani, 'Perseverance in peace process'. Frontline, 29 August 2003. Archived 26 March 2005 at the Wayback Machine
- ^T. S. Murty & Neville Maxwell, Tawang and 'The Un-Negotiated Dispute' The China Quarterly, No. 46. (Apr. – Jun. 1971), pp. 357–362. Archived 8 February 2017 at the Wayback Machine.
- ^* Garver, John W. (2006), 'China's Decision for War with India in 1962'(PDF), in Robert S. Ross (ed.), New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy, Stanford University Press, ISBN978-0-8047-5363-0, archived from the original on 28 August 2017
- ^Fisher, Rose & Huttenback, Himalayan Battleground (1963), p. 99.
- ^'China's Ladakh Incursion Well-planned'. Archived from the original on 19 August 2017.
- ^'India sends out doves, China sends in chopper', Hindustan Times, archived from the original on 27 May 2013
- ^'India, China caught in a bitter face-off', Hindustan Times, archived from the original on 26 May 2013
- ^'India and China 'pull back troops' in disputed border area'. BBC News. 6 May 2013. Archived from the original on 13 May 2015. Retrieved 14 September 2015.
- ^Hari Kumar (26 September 2014). 'India and China Step Back From Standoff in Kashmir'. New York Times. Archived from the original on 20 July 2016.
- ^'Chinese and Indian troops in Himalayan standoff', Reuters, 23 September 2014, archived from the original on 11 September 2016
- ^'Why border stand-offs between India and China are increasing', BBC News, 26 September 2014, archived from the original on 12 September 2016
- ^'India-China troops face-off near Line of Actual Control in Ladakh', The Economic Times, 13 July 2018, archived from the original on 15 September 2015
- ^ abcdeManoj Joshi, Doklam: To Start at the Very Beginning
- ^ abcManoj Joshi, Doklam, Gipmochi, Gyemochen: It’s Hard Making Cartographic Sense of a Geopolitical Quagmire
- ^ abHT Correspondent Blow by blow: A timeline of India, China face-off over Doklam
- ^A Staff Writer Doklam standoff ends: A timeline of events over the past 2 months
- ^Shishir Gupta, Bhutan issues demarche to Beijing, protests over India-China border row
- ^'Sikkim (Indien), 14. April 1975 : Abschaffung der Monarchie -- [in German]'. www.sudd.ch. Archived from the original on 18 August 2017.
- ^'Sikkim Votes to End Monarchy, Merge With India'. The New York Times. 16 April 1975. Archived from the original on 19 August 2017.
- ^ abD. S. Rajan, 'China: An internal Account of Startling Inside Story of Sino-Indian Border Talks', South Asia Analysis Group, 10-June-2008. Archived 13 June 2010 at the Wayback Machine
- ^Scott, David (2011). Handbook of India's International Relations. Routledge. p. 80. ISBN9781136811319.
![Maps Of India With Actual Areas Under Control Maps Of India With Actual Areas Under Control](https://qph.fs.quoracdn.net/main-qimg-3db1dc7b7d992f11823aa6af19c43b1e.webp)
Bibliography[edit]
- Fisher, Margaret W.; Rose, Leo E.; Huttenback, Robert A. (1963), Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh, Praeger – via Questia
- Maxwell, Neville (1970), India's China War, Pantheon Books, ISBN978-0-394-47051-1. Also available on scribd.
- Woodman, Dorothy (1970) [first published in 1969 by Barrie & Rockliff, The Cresset Press], Himalayan Frontiers: A Political Review of British, Chinese, Indian, and Russian Rivalries, Praeger